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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Jonathon Earl Folk appeals from his conviction for sexual abuse of a child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The factual and procedural background of the case was set forth by the 
Court in the first appeal of this case: 
On December 25, 2007, at about 5:30 p.m., the mother of three 
minor children (Mother) arrived home after running an errand and 
went into the kitchen to help her grandmother finish preparing 
Christmas dinner. As she was walking to the kitchen, Jonathan Folk 
(Defendant) was in the living room. He had come over to pick up a 
house guest. After about ten to fifteen minutes, Mother walked into 
the living room and asked her husband where their five-year-old 
son (Child) was. He said that he thought Child was in his bedroom. 
Mother walked to Child’s room, and as she was nearing the open 
door to the room she heard Child say, “That’s gross.” As she 
walked into the room, she saw Child lying on his back on the bed 
and Defendant kneeling down in front of Child with Child’s legs 
around Defendant and his hands on Child’s hips. The bed was a 
small child’s bed, about ten inches off the floor. Mother asked what 
they were doing, and both Child and Defendant said they were just 
playing. Both Defendant and Child were fully clothed, and it did not 
appear that either of them had just pulled or zipped their pants up. 
Mother did not see any signs of any type of sexual act by 
Defendant. Defendant stood up and walked out of Child’s room, 
and then returned and sat on the floor while Child picked up his 
toys pursuant to Mother’s instructions. Defendant and the guest left 
about one and one-half hours later. At about 4:00 a.m. that night, 
Child awakened Mother and stated that he had just had a 
nightmare. Mother asked what it was about, and Child responded 
that it was about what that guy did to Child last night. Mother asked 
what guy, but Child would not answer. Later that morning, Mother 
telephoned the police and then asked Child what had happened 
last night. Child answered that Defendant had placed his mouth on 
Child’s penis. 
 
On January 9, 2008, the State filed a complaint charging Defendant 
with lewd conduct by committing oral-to-genital contact with Child. 
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State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 331, 256 P.3d 735, 739 (2011).  Folk was convicted 
after a jury trial.  Id.  In the first appeal the Court concluded that Folk’s rights to a 
speedy trial were not violated, id. at 331-36, 256 P.3d at 739-44; his right to 
confrontation was violated, id. at 336-39, 256 P.3d at 744-47; his right to self-
representation was infringed, id. at 339, 256 P.3d at 747; and found error in the 
jury instructions for allowing convictions for uncharged conduct or conduct that 
did not constitute lewd conduct with a child, id. at 339-42, 256 P.3d at 747-50. 
 The case was re-tried, and Folk again convicted.  State v. Folk, 157 Idaho 
869, 873, 341 P.3d 586, 590 (Ct. App. 2014).  The Idaho Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that evidence of the victim’s statements was properly admitted 
through the mother, but evidence of prior convictions was improperly admitted 
under I.R.E. 404(b).  Id. at 873-80, 341 P.3d at 590-97.  On remand, the state 
amended the charge from lewd conduct to sexual abuse of a child with a 
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 591-92, 673-74.)  The jury on the 
second re-trial convicted Folk of sexual abuse of a child, the district court 
dismissed the persistent violator enhancement and imposed a fixed sentence of 
25 years, and Folk timely appealed.  (R., pp. 801-16, 842-53.)   
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ISSUES 
 
 Folk presents seven issues on appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)  Due to 
their number and length the state does not reproduce them here.  The state 
rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Folk failed to show error in the admission of evidence of his statement 
of intent to sexually molest children? 
 
2. Has Folk failed to show error in the admission of evidence that he put his 
mouth on the victim’s penis in the course of sexually abusing him by tickling him 
and grabbing his hips, as evidence of Folk’s sexual intent? 
 
3. Has Folk failed to show the district erred by holding that extrinsic evidence 
of a prior statement was not admissible where the victim admitted making the 
prior statement? 
 
4. Does Folk’s argument that the district court erred by admitting detective 
Galbreaith’s testimony fail because Folk has not addressed the ruling actually 
made by the district court? 
 
5. Has Folk failed to show that the evidence is inadequate to support his 
conviction? 
 
6. Has Folk failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument that Folk had not impeached testimony about his statement of future 
intent to sexually abuse children? 
 
7. Has Folk failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s rebuttal to 
Folk’s argument regarding why he did not want to be cross-examined? 
 
8. Has Folk has failed to show cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Folk Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Statement 
Of Intent To Sexually Molest Children 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Prior to the second re-trial Folk filed a motion to exclude the testimony of 
Blaine Blair.  (R., pp. 165-99.)  At the first two trials Blair, a housemate of Folk at 
the time of the charged offense, testified that Folk told him he did not want to 
stop sexually abusing children.  (R., pp. 348, 351-52.)  The state acknowledged 
that the evidence was not admissible to prove past sexual abuse, but argued it 
was admissible to prove the future sexual abuse charged in this case.  (R., pp. 
351-56.)  Although the state’s primary argument was that evidence Folk stated 
he did not want to stop sexually abusing children was itself admissible, the state 
also posited that the prejudice of the implicit admission of past sexual abuse in 
Folk’s statement could be eliminated by use of a leading question to ask Blair 
only whether Folk expressed a desire to sexually abuse children.  (R., pp. 356-
57.)  The district court provisionally held that the evidence was admissible to 
prove sexual intent and negate innocent intent, such as horseplay.  (R., pp. 491-
95.) 
 The state filed a motion in limine to clarify whether it could use Blair’s 
testimony in its case-in-chief, again suggesting that a carefully worded question 
could avoid any testimony regarding any admission to prior sexual abuse. 
(R., pp. 556-59; 8/3/15 Tr., p. 71, L. 13 – p. 73, L. 2.)  The district court granted 
the motion, finding the testimony admissible to prove sexual intent if introduced 
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without any reference to prior sexual abuse.  (R., pp. 687, 693-95; 08/20/15 Tr., 
p. 8, L. 12 – p. 9, L. 11; Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 21, L. 22 - p. 25, L. 3.)  At trial the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q Did you and Jonathon [Folk] ever discuss things?  Yes or 
no? 
 
A Yes. 
 
Q Okay.  Did you and Jonathon ever share secrets with one 
another?  Yes or no? 
 
A Yes. 
 
Q Now again, this is yes or no.  Did the defendant, Jonathon 
Folk, ever say anything to you indicating that he desired to sexually 
abuse children?  Yes or no? 
 
A Yes. 
 
Q How many times did he express that to you? 
 
A Just once. 
 
(Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 596, L. 15 – p. 597, L. 3.) 
 Folk asserts that the district court erred because his statement of his 
desire to sexually abuse children is either irrelevant or its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-30.)  
Application of the law to the record, however, shows that Folk has failed to show 
error.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court.”  State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011).  Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo whereas the 
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weighing process under I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 666, 227 P.3d 918, 920 (2010). 
 
C. Evidence Of Folk’s Statement Of Desire To Sexually Molest Children Was 
Relevant And Its Probative Value Was Not Substantially Outweighed By 
Any Potential Prejudice 
 
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  I.R.E. 401.  See also State 
v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).  Irrelevant 
evidence is inadmissible, but relevant evidence “is admissible except as 
otherwise provided by these rules.”  I.R.E. 402.  “Whether a fact is material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.”  
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) (citation 
omitted).   
The state charged Folk with “tickling” the victim’s stomach or feet or 
“touching” the victim’s hips “with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual 
desires.”  (R., p. 673.)  The evidence that Folk expressed a desire to sexually 
abuse children made the state’s theory that Folk had sexual intent when he 
touched or tickled the victim’s stomach, feet or hips more probable than it would 
be without the evidence. Under the applicable legal standards the evidence of 
Folk’s statement that he desired to sexually abuse children was relevant. 
Folk contends his statement was too vague to make his sexual intent 
more likely.  He argues that because tickling or touching a victim’s stomach, feet 
or hips is not commonly considered sexual abuse, the jury could not infer from 
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his general statement of desire to sexually abuse children that he would have 
sexual intent when he tickled or touched this particular child’s stomach, feet or 
hips.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)  This analysis is flawed because the evidence of 
Folk’s generalized statement of intent to sexually abuse children puts his actions 
of touching a child once he was alone with that child in a context that makes his 
sexual intent more probable.  Folk’s expression of a generalized desire to 
sexually abuse children makes it more probable that his touching a child, and the 
acts leading up to that touching such as securing an opportunity to be alone with 
that child, was not innocent, but was rather done with sexual motive or desire.   
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the 
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.  Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, 
in the district court’s discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice—which is the 
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis—substantially outweighs 
the probative value of the evidence.  State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993).   
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party’s case.  See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant.”).  Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
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is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis.  Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As previously 
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: “Under the rule, the evidence is only 
excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence.”  State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 
(1990) (emphasis in original).   
 The district court concluded the evidence of Folk’s statement of desire to 
sexually abuse children was “highly relevant to the issues of motive, intent, or 
absence of mistake or accident,” “probative of Folk’s state of mind,” and “gives 
an explanation as to why he would place himself alone with a child or touch a 
child.”  (R., pp. 694-95 (internal quotations omitted).)  The only unfair prejudice 
identified by the district court was the inference of past sexual abuse of children, 
which the district court eliminated by requiring the presentation of only evidence 
of a statement of future intent or motive.  (R., p. 695.)   
By eliminating evidence of past sexual abuse of children, the evidence 
was effectively removed from the scope of I.R.E. 403 and 404(b).  The latter rule 
applies to “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” admitted to prove 
“character in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” 
I.R.E. 404(b).  “The term ‘acts’ or the phrase ‘other acts’ does not encompass 
every fact in the case as opposed to the facts relating to the [charged crime] 
itself.”  State v. Sams, ___ Idaho ___, 382 P.3d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 2016).  
Rather, the rule “is principally designed to protect against admission of purely 
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propensity evidence.”  Id. at ___, 382 P.3d at 368–69.  Once the inference of 
previous sexual abuse of children was removed, the evidence of Folk’s statement 
no longer contained a “crime, wrong or act” to which the rule applied.1  Rule 
404(b) was therefore no longer a viable ground for excluding the evidence.  
Likewise, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403 because it no 
longer carried the potential to invite the jury to decide the case on an improper 
basis.  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that any 
potentially unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s 
probative value. 
On appeal Folk contends that the probative value of the testimony was 
“extremely low” because Blair’s memory was “disastrous” and he had purportedly 
made a conflicting statement to a police officer.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.)  
However, the measurement of probative value of evidence is its effect “if believed 
by the jury.”  State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 216, 207 P.3d 186, 192 (Ct. App. 
2009).  See also State v. Salazar, 153 Idaho 24, 27-28, 278 P.3d 426, 429-30 
(Ct. App. 2012) (argument that identification evidence could have led to 
misidentification not proper basis for exclusion under I.R.E. 403); State v. 
Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying “if 
believed” standard); State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 202, 646 P.2d 441, 444 
(Ct. App. 1982) (applying “if believed” standard).  A witness’s testimony is not 
                                            
1 Even if the words themselves could be deemed “acts” under I.R.E. 404(b), the 
words, as presented to the jury, were entirely an expression of motive or intent, 
proof of which is specifically allowable under the rule.  I.R.E. 404(b).  To the 
extent a specific statement of motive can be considered evidence of character, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the probative value not 
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. 
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rendered irrelevant just because a party claims the witness is unreliable (a 
determination that is the province of the jury).  Folk has failed to show error in the 
district court’s determination that the evidence was “highly relevant.” 
(R., pp. 694-95.) 
Folk next argues that the evidence was prejudicial because he could not 
impeach it without making the jury aware of the entire statement with its 
implication that he had sexually abused children before.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 27-29.)  The legal standard for unfair prejudice, however, is the tendency of 
the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis.  Floyd, 125 Idaho at 
654, 873 P.2d at 908.  Folk’s argument, that he could not effectively impeach the 
admitted evidence without the jury learning of excluded prejudicial evidence,2 
does not articulate how the evidence might suggest a decision on an improper 
basis.  That Folk concluded that evidence of the entirety of his statement was 
more prejudicial than helpful to his defense, and therefore chose not to admit the 
entire statement, does not show any prejudice relevant to the I.R.E. 403 analysis.  
Evidence of Folk’s statement that he did not want to stop sexually abusing 
children contained both a retrospective acknowledgement of prior sexual abuse 
of children and a prospective statement of intent to sexually abuse children.  By 
preventing admission of the retrospective acknowledgement of prior sexual 
abuse of children while admitting evidence of the prospective statement of intent 
to sexually abuse children, the district court eliminated the potential for unfair 
                                            
2 Folk does not articulate how admitting evidence of the entirety of his statement 
would have impeached Blair. 
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prejudice.  Even if some potential for unfair prejudice remained, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of future intent. 
 
II. 
Folk Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence That He Orally 
Copulated The Child In The Course Of Conduct That Included His Crime Of 
Sexual Touching 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Folk moved to exclude evidence that he put his mouth on the child’s penis 
in the course of sexually abusing the child, asserting that the state, by amending 
the charge to sexual abuse by touching the child’s stomach, feet or hips had 
“abandoned its right to present testimony related to this allegation.”  (R., pp. 615-
19.)  The district court denied this motion, concluding that the evidence was not 
“unfairly prejudicial.”  (R., pp. 688-89.)  Recognizing that its analysis would be 
different if the oral copulation had happened at an earlier or later date than the 
charged sexual touching, the court stated, “Because of the contemporary nature 
of the acts involved, [the evidence of oral copulation of the child] is directly 
related to the charged conduct.”  (R., p. 689; see also 8/20/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-4 
(charged and uncharged actions were “proximate in time,” “contemporary” and 
“closely associated”).)  Citing the “complete story principle,” the district court 
stated that “[a]llowing the jury to know exactly what happened at the time of the 
alleged incident will not result in unfair prejudice to Folk.”  (R., p. 689; see also 
8/20/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 6, L. 9.) 
 On appeal Folk argues the district court erred, reasoning that even if he 
did have sexual intent when he put his mouth on the child’s penis, that does not 
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make it more probable that he had sexual intent when he touched and tickled the 
child in the same course of conduct, and any inference that it does is unfairly 
prejudicial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-37.)  Application of relevant legal standards 
shows no error in the admission of the evidence.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo whereas the weighing 
process under I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 666, 227 P.3d 918, 920 (2010). 
 
C. Folk Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence That His Course 
Of Conduct Included Putting His Mouth On The Victim’s Penis 
 
 As set forth above in more detail, evidence is relevant if it has “any 
tendency” to prove a fact of consequence and relevant evidence may be 
excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative 
value.  I.R.E. 401, 403.  The fact of consequence relevant to this issue is whether 
Folk’s touching of the child’s stomach, hips or feet was accomplished “with the 
intent to gratify [his] lust, passions, or sexual desire.”  I.C. § 18-1506(1).  
Application of the relevant legal analysis shows the evidence that Folk’s course 
of conduct resulted in oral copulation was admissible to show sexual intent at 
different stages of the course of conduct. 
 “[A]ll facts inseparably connected to the chain of events of which the act 
charged in the information is a part are admissible even though the full story 
shows the commission of other crimes.”  State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670, 
534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975) (internal quotes and citations omitted) quoted in 
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State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18, 878 P.2d 188, 192 (Ct. App. 1994).  “[T]he 
state is entitled to present to the jury a complete account of the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of a crime.”  State v. Buzzard, 
110 Idaho 800, 802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986).  The complete story 
principle “is an independent basis of admission when the uncharged crimes are 
so inseparably connected to the charged crime that a complete account of the 
charged crime cannot be given without also detailing the uncharged crime.”  
State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 976, 712 P.2d 674, 677 (Ct. App. 1985).   
 The district court applied the correct legal standards.  (R., pp. 688-89.)  It 
reasoned that evidence showing that Folk’s course of conduct included Folk 
putting his mouth on the penis of the victim was evidence tending to show that 
Folk’s intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desire was present throughout, 
including the charged touching.  (Id.; 8/20/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 6, L. 9.)  The 
district court correctly concluded that evidence showing that Folk’s course of 
conduct culminated in a completed sexual act would provide the complete story 
applicable to Folk’s interaction with the victim and tended to show Folk’s sexual 
motivation throughout that course of conduct. 
 Folk argues the district court erred in finding the evidence relevant 
because evidence of oral copulation was not evidence of grooming nor was it 
“probative of a continuing criminal design.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 35.)  This 
argument does not withstand scrutiny.  That Folk’s course of conduct culminated 
in an overtly sexual act is evidence that he intended his course of conduct to 
culminate in a sexual act.  If he intended his conduct to culminate in a sexual act 
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it is more likely he acted with sexual intent throughout.  That he acted with sexual 
intent throughout makes it more likely that the tickling and touching that led up to 
the overtly sexual act was done “with the intent to gratify [his] lust, passions, or 
sexual desire.”  I.C. § 18-1506(1).  Folk’s denials notwithstanding, the jury could 
easily conclude that Folk’s intent to gratify his lust, passions or sexual desire did 
not start the moment his lips touched his victim’s penis, but instead that the 
touching and tickling was, to Folk, a form of foreplay or sexual touching from 
which Folk received sexual gratification.  Folk has failed to show that evidence of 
an overtly sexual act within a course of conduct is not relevant to show that other 
acts in the same course of conduct, which are not overtly sexual, were 
nevertheless committed with sexual intent. 
 Folk also argues that the potential for unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence.  As set forth above, a person 
whose tickling and touching of a child culminates in an overtly sexual act is much 
more likely acting to gratify lusts, passions or sexual desire than a person whose 
tickling and touching results in no such overtly sexual conduct.  The prejudice 
identified by Folk is that the jury could become confused and convict him for the 
oral copulation rather than for the charged acts of tickling and touching of the 
child’s stomach, feet and hips.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 37.)  The record, however, 
establishes no such possibility of confusion as claimed by Folk. 
A variance can occur where the jury instructions given at trial allow the 
jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime on one or more alternative 
theories than alleged in the charging document.  See State v. Windsor, 
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110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166, 
90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004).  The jury instructions in this case, however, 
make it clear that the jury could convict only for “the act of tickling [the child’s] 
stomach and/or feet, and or by the act of touching his hips.”  (R., p. 750.)  Folk 
has not argued that the jury would or could have ignored this instruction and 
convicted him for uncharged conduct.  On this record there was no possibility of 
jury confusion as to which acts it had to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for 
a conviction. 
 Folk also asserts the evidence is “inflammatory,” but does not articulate 
why the evidence should be so characterized.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 37.)  To the 
extent the evidence is “inflammatory” because it strongly indicates sexual intent 
in the course of conduct, such is not unfairly prejudicial.  “Evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.”  State v. 
Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011).  To the extent 
Folk contends that the evidence is “inflammatory” in the sense that it shows 
character, the district court correctly applied the complete story principle and 
admitted the evidence to show motive, intent and lack of mistake.  Folk has failed 
to show an abuse of discretion. 
 The evidence in this case showed that Folk engaged in a course of 
conduct that included tickling, touching and oral copulation of a child.  Folk has 
failed to show error or an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination 
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the jury should have evidence of the entire course of conduct to evaluate Folk’s 
intent when he engaged in the charged act of touching and tickling. 
 
III. 
The District Court Did Not Err By Holding That Extrinsic Evidence Of A Prior 
Statement Was Not Admissible Where The Victim Admitted Making The Prior 
Statement  
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court several times sustained objections to efforts by Folk and 
his counsel to read a transcript of the victim’s prior testimony to the victim during 
cross-examination.  (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 428, L. 9 – p. 429, L. 13; p. 433, L. 2 – 
p. 434, L. 4; p. 451, L. 17 – p. 452, L. 12; p. 463, L. 22 – p. 468, L. 15; p. 477, 
Ls. 7-16; p. 481, L. 21 – p. 486, L. 14; p. 496, L. 2 – p. 497, L. 6; p. 500, L. 20 – 
p. 501, L. 16; p. 502, L. 21 – p. 503, L. 17; p. 504, L. 13 – p. 505, L. 8; p. 506, 
L. 9 – p. 507, L. 21.)  The district court made clear that its rulings were based on 
I.R.E. 612, which addresses refreshment of recollection, and I.R.E. 613, which 
addresses impeachment with prior statements.  (E.g., Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 451, 
L. 17 – p. 452, L. 10; p. 467, L. 1 – p. 468, L. 15; p. 486, Ls. 6-14; p. 504, L. 25 – 
p. 505, L. 8; p. 507, Ls. 18-21.)  In addressing Rule 613(b) the district court 
consistently stated, and ruled accordingly, that the proper process for 
impeachment with prior inconsistent statements was to confront the witness with 
the statement and, if he admits having made the statement, the impeachment is 
complete.  (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 465, L. 4 – p. 468, L. 8 (if witness says he made 
the statement in the first trial, but does not remember it now, “then you’ve made 
your point and you have to go on”); p. 486, Ls. 6-14 (“If he denies it, then you can 
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submit extrinsic evidence.  If he doesn’t deny it, then you’ve made your point and 
you get to move on.”); p. 504, L. 25 – p. 505, L. 8 (extrinsic evidence of prior 
inconsistent statement admissible only if witness denies making it); p. 507, 
Ls. 18-21 (“I think you need to ask him, did you previously testify to X, Y, and Z.  
And if he denies it—you confront him with what he said.  If he denies it again, I’ll 
let you present the transcript.”).)  The district court also let the jury consider all 
evidence of prior testimony as substantive evidence.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 535, L. 6 – 
p. 536, L. 19.) 
 On appeal Folk contends that the district court erred under I.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(A), which defines when prior testimony is not hearsay, and I.R.E. 613, 
which governs impeachment with prior statements.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 39-42.)  
The former argument is not preserved because the district court never ruled on a 
hearsay objection, and Folk does not claim fundamental error.  The latter 
argument, that the district court erred under I.R.E. 613, is not supported by the 
law or the record. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The trial court’s judgment concerning admission of evidence shall only be 
disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (internal quotes omitted). 
 
C. Folk’s I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) Argument Is Not Preserved 
 
It is well-established that an objection on one basis is insufficient to 
preserve an objection on a completely different basis.  “For an objection to be 
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preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for the objection must be 
clearly stated.”  State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 
2000) (citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1); State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 
721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)).  “Objecting to the admission of evidence on one basis 
does not preserve a separate and different basis for exclusion of the 
evidence.”  Id. (citing State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596, 836 P.2d 536, 542 
(1992); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592, 944 P.2d at 727).  Application of this law to 
the record shows Folk’s claims based on a hearsay argument are not preserved. 
 Folk argues that the “district court erred by not allowing Mr. Folk to 
introduce extrinsic evidence of [the victim’s] prior sworn testimony.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 39.)  He claims that the victim’s “prior testimony” was “admissible non-
hearsay” and “admissible for impeachment.”  (R., p. 42.)  The authority he relies 
upon is I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), which addresses the definition of hearsay, and I.R.E. 
613(b), which governs admission of extrinsic evidence .  (Appellant’s brief, p. 41.)  
Folk cites to vast swaths of transcript rather than identifying any particular 
objection or ruling.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 42.)  Although his argument based on 
I.R.E. 613 is preserved because the district court made several rulings based on 
this rule, because Folk has failed to cite a single objection or ruling based on 
hearsay in general or I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) in specific, he has failed to establish 
that his argument based on I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) is preserved.3   
                                            
3 In addition, the district court stated at one point that its rulings to that point had 
been based on I.R.E. 612.  (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 451, L. 17 – p. 452, L. 1.)  Folk 
has not claimed on appeal that the district court misapplied Rule 612, and has 
therefore not challenged the district court’s rulings under Rule 612.  Only the 
district court’s rulings based on I.R.E. 613 are preserved on this record. 
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D. Folk Has Shown No Error Under I.R.E. 613 
 
 “Under I.R.E. 613, inconsistent out-of-court statements may be used to 
impeach a witness’ trial testimony.”  State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 248, 
880 P.2d 771, 778 (Ct. App. 1994).  Extrinsic evidence of past inconsistent 
statements is admissible only if “the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain 
or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded the opportunity to interrogate 
the witness thereon.”  I.R.E. 613.  However, “even if all the foundational elements 
of Rule 613 are met, a district court is not unequivocally bound to admit any or all 
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.”  United States v. Young, 
248 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2001).  “If a witness admits making prior inconsistent 
statements, there is no necessity for further proof, as by admission of the prior 
inconsistent written statements.”  United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 
1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1987).  See also Rush v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 399 F.3d 
705, 723 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We long have held that when a witness admits to 
making a prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic proof of the statement is 
inadmissible.”).4   
                                            
4 But see United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible even though the witness admits making 
the prior inconsistency.”).  As indicated, the federal circuits are split as to whether 
impeachment with extrinsic evidence is allowed under Fed.R.Evid. 613(b) after 
the witness admits making the inconsistent statement.  No Idaho precedent 
clearly interprets Idaho’s equivalent rule, although the Idaho Supreme Court has 
stated that it “has not held, and the rule does not imply, that an outright denial of 
having made a prior statement is required in order for the prior statement to be 
used for impeachment purposes.”  State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 104, 334 P.3d 
280, 295 (2014) (emphasis added).  The Idaho Courts have not addressed the 
issue of whether an admission of having made the statement completes 
impeachment. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated and applied the relevant legal 
standard as follows: 
This Court has not held, and the rule does not imply, that an 
outright denial of having made a prior statement is required in order 
for the prior statement to be used for impeachment purposes. See 
I.R.E 613. The question is whether the support Salina Koch showed 
in her testimony for her husband and her denial that he seemed to 
have had a close relationship with C.C. are inconsistent with 
Salina’s prior statement that she had suspicions something was 
going on between C.C. and her husband. 
 
State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 104, 334 P.3d 280, 295 (2014).  To answer the 
question of whether statements are inconsistent, the court should apply a 
standard “which ‘allows the prior statement whenever a reasonable man could 
infer on comparing the whole effect of the two statements that they had been 
produced by inconsistent beliefs.’” Id. at 104, 334 P.3d at 295 (quoting United 
States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir.1977) (quoting 4 Weinstein’s 
Evidence, Matthew Bender, 801–76–801–76.1 (1976)).  The Court “declin[ed] to 
adopt a rigid definition that an inconsistency is only found when it is apparent on 
the face of two statements to the extent that it is the only possible inference to be 
drawn” because “[t]rial judges must retain a high degree of discretion in deciding 
the exact point at which a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent with a 
witness’s trial testimony to permit its use in evidence.”  Koch, 157 Idaho at 104, 
334 P.3d at 295.  Importantly, prior inconsistent statements “are not hearsay 
because they are not offered for the truth of any of the facts asserted, but rather, 
solely to impeach the credibility of the witness.”  Id. at 103, 334 P.3d at 294 
(emphasis added).  The Court ultimately affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
allowed the state to call a detective to testify regarding statements made by a 
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witness (the defendant’s wife) that were inconsistent with the witness’s trial 
testimony after instructing the jury that the evidence was for impeachment only 
and not to be considered for the truth of the matters asserted.  Id. at 103-04, 334 
P.3d at 294-95. 
 As noted above, at several points in the victim’s testimony in this case the 
district court held that the proper process for impeachment with prior inconsistent 
statements under I.R.E. 613 was to confront the witness with the statement and, 
if he admits having made the statement, the impeachment is complete.  (Trial Tr., 
vol. 1, p. 465, L. 4 – p. 468, L. 8 (if witness says he made the statement in the 
first trial, but does not remember it now, “then you’ve made your point and you 
have to go on”); p. 486, Ls. 6-14 (“If he denies it, then you can submit extrinsic 
evidence.  If he doesn’t deny it, then you’ve made your point and you get to move 
on.”); p. 504, L. 25 – p. 505, L. 8 (extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 
statement admissible only if witness denies making it).)  This ruling is entirely 
consistent with the applicable law.  The district court did not exceed its discretion 
by excluding (if in fact it did so) admission of extrinsic evidence establishing that 
the witness made a prior inconsistent statement where the fact that the witness 
made the statement was established by the witness’s own admission.5 
                                            
5 Because the district court excluded extrinsic evidence of statements only where 
the witness admitted making the statement, any error was also harmless.  “The 
inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have 
convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  Moreover, the district court specifically instructed the jury 
that it could consider evidence of prior testimony (but not unsworn interviews) as 
substantive evidence.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 535, L. 6 – p. 536, L. 19.)  Because 
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 Folk points out that a witness’s denial of memory of having made a prior 
statement allows use of extrinsic evidence of the statement for impeachment.  
(Appellant‘s brief, pp. 41-42 (citing Pruess v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 170-71, 
730 P.2d 1089, 1090-91 (1986)).  While this is generally true, it is also true that 
“[t]rial judges must retain a high degree of discretion in deciding the exact point at 
which a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent with a witness’s trial testimony 
to permit its use in evidence.”  Koch, 157 Idaho at 104, 334 P.3d at 295.  Here 
the witness several times testified that he did not remember making statements 
in his prior testimony, but always acknowledged that he had, in fact, made the 
statement in the transcript he was shown.  (E.g., Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 469, L. 25 – 
p. 470, L. 5; p. 470, Ls. 19-24; p. 471, Ls. 9-25; p. 472, Ls. 4-13; p. 475, Ls. 1-4; 
p. 479, Ls. 10-17; p. 480, Ls. 8-12; p. 485, Ls. 9-25; p. 501, L. 17 – p. 502, L. 20; 
p. 507, L. 22 – p. 508, L. 1; p. 509, L. 25 – p. 510, L. 13.)  The district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the witness admitted having made 
the former statements.  Furthermore, once the witness admitted making the 
statements and the jury was apprised of the content of the statement the court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that further impeachment with the 
statement would be beneficial.  I.R.E. 403.  Because the district court did not 
abuse its discretion, Folk has failed to show error. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                  
evidence of the substance of the prior testimony was before the jury, and the jury 
was allowed to consider the evidence substantively, any alleged error was 
harmless. 
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IV. 
Folk’s Argument That The District Court Erred By Admitting Detective 
Galbreaith’s Testimony Fails Because He Has Not Addressed The Ruling 
Actually Made By The District Court 
 
 Folk cross-examined the victim about his interview with Detective 
Galbreaith.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 424, L. 3 – p. 427, L. 1; p. 472, L. 15 – p. 475, L. 9.)  
Included in that cross-examination was the following exchange: 
Q BY DEFENDANT FOLK: Do you remember saying—do you 
remember telling the detective that Jon—that he didn’t actually 
touch me? 
 
A No. 
 
Q Would it help to refresh your memory if you looked at the 
transcript? 
 
A Maybe.  I don’t know. 
 
(Tr., vol. 1, p. 424, Ls. 18-24.)  At that point Folk moved to show the victim the 
transcript but there was apparently an issue with what transcript Folk was using, 
resolved by a sidebar, and Folk moved on to a different topic until later when 
everyone had the right transcript and he resumed his cross-examination about 
that interview.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 424, L. 25 – p. 427, L. 3; p. 472, L. 15 – p. 473, 
L. 10.)  Folk then cross-examined the victim extensively based on statements in 
the transcript of the interview.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 473, L. 11 – p. 479, L. 9.)  In re-
direct examination the victim again testified that he did not recall whether he had 
told the detective that Folk touched him or not.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 517, L. 12 – p. 518, 
L. 8.)   
 When Detective Galbreaith testified the prosecution asked him whether 
the victim had disclosed sexual abuse in the detective’s interview.  (Tr., vol. 2, 
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p. 627, Ls. 1-9.6)  The defense asserted a hearsay objection, and the prosecutor 
argued the detective’s testimony regarding the interview of the victim was 
admissible as a prior consistent statement.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 627, L. 10 – p. 630, 
L. 3.)  The district court ultimately allowed limited testimony on the subject, but 
only for establishing credibility and not for the truth of the matter asserted. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 630, L. 4 – p. 631, L. 23; p. 634, L. 3 – p. 635, L. 3.)  The 
prosecution then elicited testimony that during the interview the victim did 
disclose oral-genital contact by Folk.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 633, Ls. 9-25.)   
 Folk claims the district court admitted the evidence “to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted,” and argues this was error because the evidence “was not 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 44-45.)  The record, however, shows that the district court did not admit 
the testimony regarding the detective’s interview for the truth of matters asserted 
by the victim therein. The district court specifically admitted the testimony as it 
related to credibility and instructed the jury that it was not to consider the 
evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 630, Ls. 4-21; p. 631, 
Ls. 11-23; p. 634, L. 3 – p. 635, L. 2.)  Because Folk’s argument that the 
evidence was improperly admitted as substantive evidence is based on a false 
premise not supported by the record, and because he has failed to address the 
ruling actually made by the district court, Folk has failed to show error.  See 
Andersen v. Prof’l Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 
                                            
6 There appears to be a mistranscription or a misstatement because the transcript 
says “substance abuse” rather than “sexual abuse.”  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 627, Ls. 6-8.)  
In context, however, it is clear that the topic was sexual abuse. 
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(2005) (“When a decision is based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of 
the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the 
judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds.” (internal quotations 
and citation omitted)); La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 799, 806, 353 P.3d 
420, 427 (2015) (same).   
 Folk questioned the victim in a manner calculated to leave the impression 
that he had denied sexual touching in the interview with Detective Galbreaith.  
(Tr., vol. 1, p. 424, Ls. 18-24.)  The district court allowed the state to present 
evidence of what was actually said in the interview to rebut that impression, but 
not for the truth of the matter asserted.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 630, L. 4 – p. 631, L. 23; p. 
634, L. 3 – p. 635, L. 3.)  Folk has not claimed that the actual ruling made by the 
district court was erroneous.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 43-45.)  He has therefore 
failed to show error. 
 
V. 
Folk Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Is Inadequate To Support His 
Conviction 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 After the state rested the defense moved for acquittal, specifically arguing 
lack of evidence showing sexual intent.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 643, Ls. 13-14; p. 644, 
L. 22 – p. 645, L. 8.)  The district court denied the motion, concluding the jury 
could find intent based on the inferences from evidence that Folk had stated a 
desire to sexually abuse children and the “circumstances” surrounding the 
touching.  (Tr., p. 645, L. 16 – p. 649, L. 20.)  Folk, reiterating his argument that 
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touching leading up to a sexual act is necessarily free of sexual intent, asserts 
the district court erred.  Folk’s argument lacks merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.”  State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).  An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 
121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review the 
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991).  Moreover, the facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury’s verdict.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 
112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 
C. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Show Folk’s Sexual Intent 
 
 It is well-established, both in case law and in the Idaho Code, that intent 
may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct or from circumstantial evidence.  
State v. Elias, 157 Idaho 511, 515, 337 P.3d 670, 674 (2014); State v. Reyes, 
139 Idaho 502, 506, 80 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 2003); I.C. § 18-115.  “‘[E]ven 
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when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of 
innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to 
reasonable inferences of guilt.”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 430, 348 P.3d 
1, 45 (2015) (brackets original) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 
215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009)).    
 At a family Christmas gathering, Folk spent time with five-year-old T.R. 
playing and giving him candy.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 407, Ls. 11-21; p. 410, Ls. 7-20; 
p. 412, Ls. 15-22; p. 414, Ls. 9-13.)  He then invited T.R. into T.R.’s room with 
him to play.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 414, L. 14 – p. 415, L. 1.)  In the room alone with T.R. 
Folk tickled and touched T.R.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 415, Ls. 2-10; p. 423, Ls. 16-24; Tr., 
vol. 2, p. 642, Ls. 8-18.)  Then Folk pulled down T.R.’s pants and put his mouth 
on T.R.’s penis.  (Tr., vol. 1, p. 415, Ls. 11-23.)  Folk had also previously 
expressed a desire to sexually abuse children.  (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 596, L. 15 – p. 
597, L. 3.)  Based on evidence regarding Folk’s conduct and statements, the 
district court concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find intent.  
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 646, Ls. 6-14.)  Because the evidence creates a reasonable 
inference that Folk touched the five-year-old victim with the intent to gratify his 
lust, passions, or sexual desire, the district court properly denied the motion for 
acquittal. 
 On appeal Folk contends that the jury could not infer sexual intent from his 
statement and conduct.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 46-49.)  Folk does concede that 
the jury could have seen the pre-oral copulation touching as “a means to an end,” 
but maintains that all touching done as a prelude to explicitly sexual contact is 
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done without sexual intent.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 49.)  Because there is neither 
factual nor legal basis for claiming that sexual intent is associated only with 
contact with a sexual organ, this argument fails.  The jury certainly had sufficient 
evidence to conclude that Folk touched T.R. with sexual intent during the course 
of conduct that culminated in him orally copulating the child.     
 
VI. 
Folk Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Closing 
Argument That Folk Had Not Impeached Testimony About His Statement Of 
Future Intent To Sexually Abuse Children 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 In discussing Blaine Blair’s testimony, and specifically the testimony that 
Folk told him he had a desire to sexually abuse children, the prosecutor argued 
in closing: “Mr. Folk had him on the stand, and he steered him pretty good on 
some other stuff.  Didn’t even ask him about that question. Didn’t ask him a 
single thing. When was it supposed to happen? Just you know any sort of 
argument about that.”  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 711, Ls. 2-6.)  For the first time on appeal 
Folk contends this argument improperly “ask[ed] the jury to infer facts which [the 
prosecutor] knew to be false.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 51.)  Because the only “fact” 
the prosecutor mentioned or implied in his argument was that Folk did not ask 
Blair any questions in cross-examination about his testimony that Folk had 
expressed a desire to sexually abuse children, a fact that is true, Folk has shown 
no fundamental error.    
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”  State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).  If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  To show 
fundamental error:  
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
 
Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).   
 
C. Folk Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error 
 
 “It is well settled that both sides have traditionally been afforded 
considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss 
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom.”  State v. Eldred, 148 Idaho 317, 323, 222 P.3d 1011, 1017 
(Ct. App. 2009).  This includes comment on “the failure … to introduce material 
evidence or to call logical witnesses.”  State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 
671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983). See also State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 873, 
 30 
 
332 P.3d 767, 785 (2014) (prosecutor may generally comment on the “lack” of 
defense evidence).  Pointing out that Folk did not cross-examine Blair regarding 
his testimony that Folk had expressed a desire to sexually abuse children, 
despite extensive cross-examination about other aspects of Blair’s testimony 
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 710, L. 20 – p. 711, L. 6), was proper argument.  Folk has shown 
no error, much less error that is plain on the record and prejudicial.   
 Folk argues that the prosecutor “ask[ed] the jury to infer facts which he 
knew to be false.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 51.)  Specifically Folk claims that the 
prosecutor knew there was evidence that would have impeached Blair but that 
Folk could not present it without alerting the jury to the fact he had sexually 
abused children in the past.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 52.)  This argument is 
unsupported by the record. 
 The evidence Folk claims for the first time on appeal would have 
impeached Blair comes from a transcript of an interview of Blair by Detective 
Galbreaith.  In the interview Blair told Detective Galbreaith that Folk had “left the 
state” after Christmas (the date of the crime at issue) “[b]ecause he knows that 
he did wrong.”  (Aug., p. 5 (Tr., p. 1, L. 22 – p. 2, L. 21).)  Folk came back around 
New Year’s Day to get his bike.  (Aug., p. 6 (Tr., p. 6, L. 6 – p. 7, L. 2).)  At that 
time he told Blair that Blair would miss him, gave him a hug, and “said goodbye.”  
(Aug., p. 6 (Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p. 7, L. 12).)  He also told Blair that “he was quit 
anyway,” meaning that he was “going to quit having contact with children.”  (Aug., 
p. 6 (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 10-16).)  Detective Galbreaith asked Blair when Folk said that 
and Blair answered, “He told me that several times.”  (Aug., p. 6 (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 17-
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19).)  Blair then told Detective Galbreaith that Folk “also said he was going to go 
to Africa.”  (Aug., p. 6 (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 21-22).) 
 Folk’s claim that this interview makes it clear on the record that the 
prosecutor knowingly misrepresented facts is specious.  First, the statement in 
the interview that Folk told him after the alleged crime that he was “quit” of having 
contact with minors does not in any way impeach Blair’s testimony that Folk 
expressed a desire to sexually abuse minors.  Even if Folk had at a relevant time 
told Blair that he was “quit” such does not actually in any way disprove that he 
also said that he did not want to quit sexually abusing children.  At best this 
evidence would show that Folk made contradictory statements about his intent 
and at worst it would show that he expressed the intent to stop molesting children 
only after the crime charged in this case.   
 Second, even if Blair’s statements to Detective Galbreaith could 
conceivably have been used to impeach his testimony there is no good faith 
basis for Folk’s appellate counsel’s claim that the prosecutor “knew” the facts in 
his argument to be false.  Indeed, if the transcript of Blair’s statements to 
Detective Galbreaith can be superficially said to impeach Blair’s trial testimony, it 
was entirely proper to comment on “the failure … to introduce material evidence 
or to call logical witnesses.”  Hodges, 105 Idaho at 592, 671 P.2d at 1055.  
Indeed, Folk’s decision to not attempt to impeach Blair on this one point of Blair’s 
testimony could easily have been because Blair would have testified that before 
the charged crime Folk expressed a desire to sexually abuse children, but after 
the charged crime he fled the state because he had “done wrong” and was “quit” 
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of sexually abusing children.  The prosecutor’s argument pointing out that, 
despite extensive cross-examination on other points of the testimony, Folk had 
not cross-examined Blair about his testimony regarding Folk’s statement was 
proper argument and Folk has failed to show constitutional, clear, and prejudicial 
error. 
 
VII. 
Folk Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Rebuttal To 
Folk’s Argument Regarding Why He Did Not Want To Be Cross-Examined 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 During closing arguments, Folk argued why he did not want to be cross-
examined as follows: 
Now you may recall that I did not testify. So I wrote this letter out so 
that I could expound on that without losing my thoughts. Because 
I’m not trained in any way.  
 
You may have noticed that I did not testify this time. I have testified 
before.  
 
MR. DEWEY Objection. Your Honor. I don’t think this is proper 
argument in any sort of way.  
 
THE COURT Well so far I don’t find it improper inasmuch as the 
state’s already produced evidence that he testified before. So I 
don’t think he has said anything so far the jury doesn’t know. But 
I’m listening very intently to make sure he stays within the bounds 
of the law.  
 
DEFENDANT FOLK: Thank you.  
 
It is a horror to be charged with a crime and to be innocent. If I 
protest too much I will be seen as guilty. If I get angry I will be seen 
as guilty. If I forget a fact under the heat of interrogation I may be 
seen as guilty.  
 
People often do not believe the accused who testifies because they 
think that he may not only be guilty of a crime but he may take the 
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oath and lie under oath to escape conviction. Nothing I say on the 
witness stand can ever acquit me.  
 
I stand before you now as pleading not guilty. Taking the stand 
allows the prosecutor to make the most innocent person look guilty. 
And anyway the state has failed to prove its case. They cannot 
prove what was not in my mind any more than the state can prove 
what was in my mind. 
 
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 732, L. 24 – p. 734, L. 4.)  In rebuttal the prosecution argued: 
Ladies and gentlemen Mr. Folk doesn’t want to be found guilty. And 
he didn’t want to be cross-examined. He didn’t want an attorney 
asking him questions. The victim of this crime didn’t get that luxury. 
And he stood -- he sat here and he was cross-examined for hours 
about what had happened. He’s not the one who’s alleged to have 
done something wrong. 
 
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 735, Ls. 5-11.)  The judge later instructed the jury: 
One thing that I feel legally bound to address at this time just to 
remind the jury -- I wouldn’t normally do this but at the beginning of 
Mr. Dewey’s rebuttal he did mention that the defendant didn’t want 
to be cross-examined by the prosecutor. I understand why he made 
that comment. Certainly it’s a response to something that was said 
by the defendant himself in his closing argument. 
 
But I do need to remind the jury that it’s important that you consider 
and remember instruction 14-A. And 14-A says that you must not 
draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant has not 
testified nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your 
deliberations in any way. 
 
Those are things that we don’t talk about and probably shouldn’t 
have been brought up. So please disregard any comment to the 
defendant’s failure to testify. 
 
(Tr., vol. 2, p. 740, Ls. 5-22.)  Instruction 14-A instructed the jury to not draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact the defendant did not testify and to not discuss 
that fact in deliberations.  (R., p. 747.)  
For the first time on appeal, Folk contends the prosecutor’s argument was 
fundamental error because it infringed on his right to silence, impermissibly 
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commented on his right to confront the witness, and potentially aroused 
sympathy for the victim.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 52-55.)  Application of the relevant 
law, however, shows Folk has failed to carry his appellate burden of showing 
fundamental error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
To prevail on a claim of fundamental error a defendant must demonstrate 
(1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear or 
obvious and lack of objection was not tactical; and (3) prejudice.  State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
 
C. Folk Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Where The Prosecutor 
Addressed A Topic (Why Folk Did Not Want To Be Cross-Examined) 
Raised By Folk In His Argument  
 
 “Direct and indirect comments on the defendant’s failure to testify at trial 
are forbidden. The rule, however, does not extend to comments on the state of 
the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to 
call logical witnesses.”  State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627, 262 P.3d 266, 
270 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).  Although the prosecution may 
not use a defendant’s silence to create an inference of guilt, evidence of 
invocation of that right may be admissible to rebut factual assertions by the 
defendant.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620 n.11 (1976); State v. 
Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 5, 121 P.3d 416, 420 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Under this 
exception, the defendants [sic] silence is admissible only for the limited purpose 
of rebutting the impression created by the defendant. The prosecution may not 
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argue that the defendant's silence is inconsistent with his or her claims of 
innocence.” (citation omitted)). 
 Folk has failed to show that his right was violated, much less that such a 
violation is clear in the record.  The prosecutor did not argue that an inference of 
guilt could be drawn from Folk’s decision to not testify.  Rather, the prosecutor 
rebutted Folk’s argument that he avoided being cross-examined by the 
prosecutor because such cross-examination can “make the most innocent 
person look guilty” by pointing out that Folk made extensive use of cross-
examination when the victim testified.  As found by the district court, the 
prosecutor’s argument was in response to Folk’s argument. (Tr., vol. 2, p. 740, 
Ls. 5-12.)  The prosecutor did not ask the jury to draw an inference of guilt, but 
rather rebutted Folk’s argument by pointing out to the jury that his claim that 
cross-examination was a means not to achieve truth but instead to make the 
innocent appear guilty was hypocritical and without merit. 
 Nor has Folk met his burden of showing prejudice.  Immediately after the 
closing arguments the district court instructed the jury that it was not to draw any 
inferences of guilt from Folk’s decision to not testify.  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 740, Ls. 5-22; 
R., p. 747.)  Jurors are presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.  See 
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013).  To the extent the 
prosecutor’s rebuttal could be interpreted as requesting the jury to draw an 
inference of guilt prejudice has not been shown because the district court 
instructed them to draw a different inference (or no inference at all). 
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D. Folk’s Claim The Prosecutor’s Rebuttal Was Fundamental Error For 
Infringing On His Right To Confrontation Or Engendering Sympathy Is 
Without Merit 
 
 The prosecutor argued, in response to Folk’s argument that he did not 
testify because he believed cross-examination would be employed to make him 
appear guilty, that the victim did not get the “luxury” of avoiding cross-
examination and that “he sat here and he was cross-examined for hours about 
what had happened.”  (Tr., vol. 2, p. 735, Ls. 5-11.)  As set forth above, the state 
submits that as a response to Folk’s argument, the prosecutor’s argument 
comparing and contrasting Folk’s statement that he believed his own cross-
examination would have made him appear guilty with his actions in cross-
examining the victim did not rise to error.  Nor was the language used by the 
prosecutor, who merely made the factual statement that the cross-examination 
lasted for hours, inflammatory such that it would engender prejudicial sympathy.  
More importantly, however, Folk has failed to demonstrate that the claimed error 
was clear, constitutional, and prejudicial. 
 In support of his argument for fundamental error Folk relies upon State v. 
Willard, 761 N.E.2d 688, 694 (Ohio App. 2001), which indicates that a statement 
that the victim had to “endure” cross-examination was “improper.”  As support for 
that conclusion the Ohio Court cited Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th 
Cir. 1999).  Id.  In that case, however, the Eighth Circuit held that such an 
argument did not amount to plain error.  Burns, 173 F.3d at 1095.  Folk has failed 
to cite any authority that a comment on the victim having to undergo cross-
examination, even if error, rose to the level of being clear, constitutional error.   
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 Finally, Folk has failed to show that merely pointing out that cross-
examination of the victim lasted for hours (without claiming the victim had to 
“endure” cross examination, Willard, 761 N.E.2d at 694, and without making a 
“sarcastic statement” that invited the jury “to punish [defendant] for making the 
victim of the crime go through the ordeal of cross-examination,” Burns, 173 F.3d 
at 1095, prejudiced him.    Even if mentioning the length of cross-examination (a 
fact the jurors witnessed in person) could be considered prejudicial, there is no 
reason to believe that it was so prejudicial as to change the outcome of the trial.  
Folk has failed to show any prong of fundamental error, much less all three. 
 
VIII. 
Folk Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
 
“The cumulative error doctrine applies when there are multiple 
irregularities at trial.”  State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 931, 354 P.3d 462, 493 
(2015).  “A necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of 
more than one error.”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 449, 348 P.3d 1, 64 
(2015) (internal quotes and brackets omitted).  “The presence of errors alone, 
however, does not require the reversal of a conviction.”  State v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 355, 386, 247 P.3d 582, 613 (2010).  This is so because “under due 
process a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not an error-free trial.”  State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)).  “[I]t is well-established that alleged errors at 
trial, that are not followed by a contemporaneous objection, will not be 
considered under the cumulative error doctrine unless said errors are found to 
 38 
 
pass the threshold analysis under our fundamental error doctrine.”  State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). 
As set forth above, Folk has failed to show multiple errors to cumulate.  To 
the extent he has shown error, such errors continue to be harmless.  Folk has 
failed to show that he did not receive a fair trial.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Folk’s conviction. 
 DATED this 11th day of January, 2017. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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